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It is argued that the Strong Free Will Theorem does not prove nonlocal determinism wrong. This
is done by the before-before (Suarez-Scarani) experiment, which is used here to prove the following
General Free Will Theorem: If humans have a certain amount of free will, there are other free
beings outside space-time producing nonlocal effects in our world, which are both random and lawful.
The proof of the Free Will Theorem (FWT) presented
by John Conway and Simon Kochen in 2006 uses the
Kochen and Specker theorem [1]. It is however conve-
nient to formulate it in the context of the Bell theorem
[2] in order to relate the FWT to experiments that have
already been done. In this context the FWT amounts
to stating that the assumption of determinism and lo-
cality are incompatible with the predictions of quantum
mechanics in entanglement experiments, provided the ex-
perimenters are free in choosing certain relevant param-
eters at each side of the setup. This is much the same as
Bell theorem states, and so far the FWT bestows upon
us nothing substantially new [3, 4], other than explaining
the deep philosophical meaning of Bell’s discovery: if hu-
mans have free will, there is free will behind the quantum
phenomena. Undoubtedly this is not of little merit.
The FWT proves only (local determinism) wrong, i.e.,
the assumption that the outcomes of an experiment are
determined by the information accessible to the particles
from their past light cones (time-ordered local causal-
ity). With the “Strong FWT”in 2009 the authors aimed
to strengthen the theorem and refute nonlocal determin-
ism as well, by allowing the outcomes to depend also on
information coming from past half-spaces (time-ordered
nonlocal causality) [1].
This Letter shows that the “Strong FWT” does not
consistently refute nonlocal determinism. This is rather
done by the before-before (Suarez-Scarani) experiment
[5–7], which is used in the follow to generalize the FWT.
We start by considering standard Bell experiments like
the one sketched in Figure 1. A source emits pairs of pho-
tons in a entangled state. One of the photons is sent to
Alice’s laboratory and measured with a convenient device
(usually an interferometer or a polarizing beam-splitter),
and the other photon is sent to Bob’s laboratory and mea-
sured with a similar device. Alice sets the parameter a
(likewise Bob for b) and gets the outcome x (respectively
y). Alice’s and Bob’s measurements happen spacelike
separated from each other.
Classically, the value x is a function of the setting a
and the variable u representing the information acces-
sible from the past light cone at the moment of Alice’s
measurement:
x = F (a, u) (1)
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FIG. 1: Suarez-Scarai model: Full deterministic causal chain
(dark-green) built of time-ordered nonlocal influences w and
time-ordered local ones u,v. The individual outcomes y de-
pends nonlocally on pre-existing x outcomes, and these de-
pend locally on the variable u; a similar (not shown) causal
chain could be drawn (light-blue, clockwise) for the alterna-
tive case of the individual x outcomes depending nonlocally
on y outcomes. The model is non-sigaling (see text).
and similarly for Bob’s measurement:
y = G(b, v) (2)
John Bell proved that the outcomes described by the
Equations (1) and (2) fulfill certain locality criteria called
Bell inequalities [2]. Bell experiments demonstrate vio-
lation of such inequalities. Therefore it holds:
Experimenter’s freedom + Bell experiment
+ Time-ordered local causality
⇒ contradiction (3)
Where the axiom Experimenter’s freedom means: The
choices Alice and Bob make (a, b) are uncorrelated to the
properties the particles may have in each run (“there is no
conspiracy”). In more technical terms: the choices a of
Alice and the responses y of Bob’s particle (the particle
measured by Bob), are not determined by information
contained in the common region of the past light cones
of Alice and Bob’s particle. And likewise for the choices
b of Bob and the responses x of Alice’s particle.
Equation (3) implies that the outcomes of a Bell exper-
iment are not determined by the information accessible
2from the past light cone of each measurement. Conway
and Kochen argue that this is much the same as stat-
ing that the particles produce their responses (x and y)
as freely as the experimenters Alice and Bob choose their
settings (a and b). Thus from (3) one is led to the FWT:
Experimenter’s freedom ⇒ Particle’s freedom (4)
Theorem (4) is nothing other than Bell’s theorem (3)
expressed in philosophical terms.
Consider now the situation in which all apparatuses
are at rest in the laboratory frame, and in this frame
Alice makes her measurements a bit before Bob does,
like represented in Figure 1. If one admits time-ordered
nonlocal causality, Alice’s outcome happening before in
time can be considered to cause Bob’s outcome happen-
ing later in time. Then it is possible to built a full deter-
ministic causal chain consisting of time-ordered nonlocal
influences (w) and time-ordered local ones (u) such that
all outcomes are determined by information accessible
from the past(half-space) at the time of measurement.
If one permits nonlocal dependencies like w, then one
has to reformulate more precisely the axiom of Freedom:
To say that Alice’s choice of a (respectively Bob’s choice
of b) is free means “that it is not determined by (i.e., is
not a function of) what has happened at earlier times (in
any inertial frame).” [1]
Accordingly the “Strong FWT” states that the re-
sponse of Alice’s particle (respectively Bob’s one) is free
in exactly the same sense, i.e., “it is not a function of
properties of that part of the universe that is earlier than
this response with respect to any given inertial frame.”
[1]. In other words, the particle’s responses cannot be
explained by information accessible from the past(half-
space) (in any frame).
The proof depends decisively on the following claim
the authors call “Axiom MIN”:
MIN: Assume that the experiments performed by Alice
and Bob are space-like separated. Then Bob can freely
choose his setting b, and Alice’s outcome x (i.e. the
response of the photon Alice measures) is independent
of Bob’s choice. Similarly and independently, Alice can
freely choose her setting a and Bob’s outcome y (i.e. the
response of the photon Bob measures) is independent of
Alice’s choice. [1]
With MIN one excludes all possible time-ordered non-
local influences like w in Figure 1. Thus, if a particles’
response is determined by properties of its past, these
are properties of the particle’s past light cone. But this
is ruled out by Theorem (3). Thus the “Strong FWT”
follows straightforwardly from MIN.
Conway and Kochen assert that MIN is motivated by
relativity and hence their result is physically relevant:
Freedom is an attribute of particles in the real universe.
However, it is possible to deny MIN without conflict-
ing with any experiment or falling into absurdities, unless
one takes into consideration the before-before experiment
[7], and therefore Conway and Kochen’s proof is not con-
sistent. I show this in the following:
These authors argue that influences like w are at odds
with relativity because in a different frame Alice may
measure after Bob, and thus Bob’s measurement cannot
be influenced by Alice’s one [1].
One can formulate this argument more accurately [4]:
Suppose that in a frame where Alice measures before
Bob her outcome x is given by the function (1), and in a
frame when she measures after Bob by the function:
x = F ′(a, u, b, v, w) (5)
And likewise for Bob:
y = G′(b, v, a, u, w) (6)
If one assumes that the outcomes are frame invariant in
any case, then from (1) and (5) it follows:
F (a, u) = F ′(a, u, b, v, w) (7)
Equation (7) implies that the function F ′ does not de-
pend on the variables b, v and w, and therefore it is
necessarily local. Similarly one proves that the function
G′ is local as well. And according to (3) local functions
cannot account for the correlations in Bell experiments.
Nonetheless, the preceding argument does not exclude
time-ordered nonlocal causality: That such a causality
conflicts with “covariance” does not necessarily mean
that it conflicts with experiment or bears absurdities.
Effectively Conway and Kochen seek to complete their
argument by stating: “To accept relativity but deny
MIN is therefore to suppose that an experimenter can
freely make a choice that will alter the past, by chang-
ing the location on a screen of a spot that has already
been observed [1]”. In other words, Conway and Kochen
claim that time-ordered nonlocal influences necessarily
imply signaling faster than light, and in their proof ex-
clude frame-dependent probability distributions in prin-
ciple (Reference [8] excludes them too). However it is
possible to construct testable non-signaling models that
assume probability distributions depending on the state
of movement of the measuring devices:
Consider the before-before experiment sketched in Fig-
ure 2. By setting the measuring devices in movement one
gets different timings. The Suarez-Scarani model [5, 6, 9]
states that if Alice’s apparatus is first to select the out-
come in its inertial frame, then the outcome x is given
by a function depending on local variables like in Equa-
tion (1). However, if Alice’s apparatus selects after in its
inertial frame, x is given by a function depending on the
settings a, b and the nonlocal variable w :
x = F ′′(a, b, w) (8)
Similarly, if Bob’s apparatus selects before in its iner-
tial frame, the outcome y is given by Equation (2), and
if it selects after, y is given by:
y = G′′(b, a, w) (9)
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FIG. 2: Before-before experiment: In the inertial frame of Al-
ice’s apparatus her measurement happens before Bob’s one.
In the inertial frame of Bob’s apparatus his measurement hap-
pens before Alice’s one. The nonlocal correlations don’t dis-
appear: The experiment refutes nonlocal determinism.
Where the dependencies expressed by F ′′ and G′′ are ob-
viously supposed to reproduce the quantum mechanical
correlations.
To date there is no proof that correlations defined ac-
cording to (1), (2), (8) and (9) are signaling [10], and I
dare to conjecture that the quantum mechanical formal-
ism prevents such a proof.
The Suarez-Scarani model combines local and nonlo-
cal hidden variables to a full time-ordered nonlocal causal
explanation of the quantum correlations, which remains
compatible with both Bell- and Michelson-Morley-type
experiments and is non-signaling. While the model can
be considered relativistic, because it accepts multisimul-
taneity, it is not Lorentzinvariant, since it assumes distri-
butions depending on the time-order. It illustrates that
Lorentzinvariance it is not a necessary condition for non-
signaling.
In before-before experiments the model makes predic-
tions conflicting with quantum mechanics: If each mea-
suring device, in its own reference frame, is first to se-
lect the output as represented in Figure 2, (8) and (9)
become irrelevant and only (1) and (2) matter. Hence
the model predicts disappearance of nonlocal correlations
with maintenance of possible local ones. By contrast
quantum mechanics predicts timing independent nonlo-
cal correlations [9].
Before-before experiments have been done and falsify
nonlocal determinism [7]. Hence one has:
Experimenter’s freedom
+ Suarez-Scarani experiment
+ Time-ordered nonlocal causality
⇒ contradiction (10)
which completes Bell’s theorem (3).
In summary, it is not true in general that“the FWT
shows that nature itself is non-deterministic” [1]. This is
rather shown by theorem (10).
Notice that the deterministic causal chain of Figure 1
can have trivial local parts u and v, and therefore is nei-
ther refuted by Leggett-type experiments [9] nor by the
proposed Colbeck-Renner ones [8]. By contrast Legget
and Colbeck-Renner extensions of quantum mechanics,
as far as they assume time-ordered nonlocal influences,
are falsified by the before-before experiment [9].
From (10) I derive the General Free Will Theorem:
If “correlations cry out for explanation” (as John Bell
liked to say [2]), then the first implication of (10) is that
the “explanation” lies outside space-time: Nonlocal cor-
relations cannot be explained by any narrative in space-
time, “the space-time does not content the whole physical
reality” (Nicolas Gisin).
Therefore expressions like “free decisions of particles”
are confused since “particle” suggests something mate-
rial located in space-time. It is more appropriate to say
that the free decisions involved in the quantum effects
come from beings outside space-time. I propose to call
such beings ’johnbells’, in honor of the discoverer of non-
locality. Although johnbells produce measurable effects,
they themselves are unobservable. Following Conway and
Kochen one can conclude: if experimenters have a cer-
tain freedom, then johnbells have exactly the same kind
of freedom [1].
Additionally, theorem (10) implies that johnbells pro-
duce nonlocal effects in space-time (correlated separated
events), which are both random and lawful: Randomness
in Alice’s lab and randomness in Bob’s lab, but in both
places the same randomness: “something very different
from classical stochasticism is at play here”[1]. The fact
that johnbells do not produce mere randomness but con-
trolled one [11] strengthens the conclusion that they have
the same kind of freedom as humans.
Then it follows:
Free human beings
⇒ Free beings outside space-time (11)
This is the General Free Will Theorem, which generalizes
theorem (4).
It is interesting to connect this result with the “Flash
ontology” (FO) proposed by Roderich Tumulka and
coworkers (usually denoted rGWRf: “relativistic GRW
model with the flash ontology”) [3]. Here the quantum
stuff are the locations (flashes) of the spontaneous local-
ization. In the experiment of Figure 2 a pair of flashes
fA, fB happens when one of Alice’s detectors and one of
Bob’s detectors jointly fire.
Conway and Kochen (in the Appendix of their 2009
paper) argue that the FWT refutes FO [1]. Here I show
that this is not the case:
FO shares three main features: it is stochastic, nonlo-
cal and covariant [3].
However FO stochasticism is very different from the
classical one: It is not so that each particle generates
random flashes; it is the pair of particles that jointly
4produce correlated random ”flashes“, which cannot be
explained by any history in space-time.
Regarding covariance FO states: “The objective facts
are where-when the flashes occur, and it is enough if a
theory prescribes, as does rGRWf, their joint distribution
in a Lorentzinvariant way.” [3]
This means: FO does not assume that nature chooses
the fB first, and fA afterwards, or the other way around:
One flash is not the cause of the other. Additionally,
the probability distributions of possible future flashes is
time-order invariant. The laws governing rGRWf are co-
variant.
According to (10) time-order nonlocal influences do not
exist. Thus each single pair of flashes (fB,fA) can be
considered a single event the concept of covariance does
not apply to. And there where this concept makes sense,
i.e., the evolution of the probability distributions, FO is
covariant.
Hence FO is perfectly compatible with the “General
FWT”.
Nonetheless, assuming that correlated events arise
without time-ordered causality, and hence physical re-
ality emerges from outside space-time, does not well fit
to “relativity”. The ’r’ in ’rGRWf’ is ambiguous and I
would advice to avoid this shortcut using ’FO’ instead.
The Suarez-Scarani model can be considered relativis-
tic but not Lorentzinvariant, and is refuted by the before-
before experiment. By contrast the FO is Lorentzinvari-
ant but not relativistic, and is not refuted by the before-
before experiment. Conway and Kochen mistakenly as-
sume that the flashes of a pair (fB,fA) in FO are time-
ordered, and time-ordered nonlocal influences necessarily
imply signaling.
Regarding ontology, FO corrects the wrong association
of the wavefunction to a sort of “cloud” evolving in space-
time. In this sense FO provides a better ontology than
Copenhagen’s collapse of the wavefunction.
However, the collapse picture has the advantage of
showing that: 1) The concept of “particle” makes sense
only at detection, and 2) Nonlocality is not necessarily
coupled to Bell inequalities or other related locality cri-
teria (GHZ), but does already happen in single particle
experiments between the two detectors.
In conclusion: No experiment can prove “the free will
of the experimenter”. Everyone is free to choose the ax-
iom of “Determinism” or the axiom of “Freedom”. But if
one chooses the latter, then the before-before experiment
demonstrates the existence of free beings outside space-
time (johnbells) controlling the random behavior of the
particles in our world.
Conway and Kochen assert: “In the present state of
knowledge, it is certainly beyond our capabilities to un-
derstand the connection between the free decisions of par-
ticles and humans, but the free will of neither of these is
accounted for by mere randomness.”[1]
The General Free Will Theorem suggests: An impor-
tant step towards understanding the “connection” may
be to say that the “free decisions” come from beings out-
side space-time rather than from “particles” in space-
time.
Recently Stephen Hawking suggested that intelligent
extraterrestrials are almost certain to exist but that
humanity should be doing all it can to avoid any contact.
In a comment it was joked that a clear sign for the
intelligence of aliens is the fact that they seem to be
doing all they can to avoid any contact with the human
species. The General Free Will Theorem proved above
rather suggests that intelligent beings dwelling outside
space-time are uninterruptedly producing phenomena
on Earth, and all over the Universe. The fact that we do
not easily realize the presence of these invisible johnbells
is probably more a sign of mental weakness on our part
than of reluctance to communicate with us on their part.
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